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The exclusionary rule is back under the judicial magnifying glass.
Recent opinions, most notably by Justice Scalia,' have sparked speculation
that the Roberts Court may be inclined to overrule Mapp v. Ohio2 and send
Fourth Amendment disputes back to the realm of civil suits and police dis-
ciplinary actions. 3 Since the exclusionary rule has had few equals in stirring
up controversy over such a wide spectrum of hot-button issues, the Court
will find a rich trove of scholarship and thinking to draw upon if it does
reconsider Mapp. Constitutional scholars have quarreled over whether
Mapp has a legitimate constitutional home or is simply an exercise of raw
judicial power. 4 Empiricists have battled over methodology in determining
the rule's costs in terms of lost convictions. 5 Students of law and human
behavior have wrangled over incentives and the best way to encourage or
coerce police compliance with the Fourth Amendment. 6 In short, a brief
* Sydney and Frances Lewis Professor of Law, Washington and Lee School of Law. The author
thanks all of the participants in the symposium for their insights and interesting give-and-take, and
Professors Rick Bascuas, Josh Dressier and George Thomas for their helpful feedback.
1. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). For an overview on the prospects of the Rob-
erts Court overruling the exclusionary rule, see Susan A. Bandes, The Roberts Court and the Future of
the Exclusionary Rule, http://www.acslaw.org/node/8512 (American Constitution Society Issue Brief)
(Apr. 1, 2009).
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. Cf Hudson, 547 U.S. at 611 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("To argue, as the majority does, that new
remedies, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions or better trained police, make suppression unnecessary is to
argue that Wolf, not Mapp, is now the law.").
4. Compare, e.g., Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Devel-
opment, and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365,
1389 (1983) ("[T]he exclusionary rule is constitutionally required, not as a 'right' explicitly incorpo-
rated in the fourth amendment's prohibitions, but as a remedy necessary to ensure those prohibitions are
observed in fact."), with Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV.
757, 785-87 (1994) (describing the exclusionary rule as an "awkward and embarrassing" remedy
contrary to the framers' intent in the Fourth Amendment).
5. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago
Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1019-22 (1987) (summarizing the inconsistent results of
various studies of the exclusionary rule's effects).
6. For a summary of arguments for and against the exclusionary rule as a deterrent, see OFFICE
OF LEGAL POL'Y, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT NO. 2, REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE EXCLUSIONARY RULE (1986), reprinted in 22 U.
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tour of the exclusionary rule offers a stop at almost every school of thought
in the legal academy and its claim to the Rightful Mode of Legal Interpreta-
tion.
Every now and then, however, a ruling that has generated intense heat
and smoke on the highest levels of doctrinal and scholarly debate also has
had a serendipitous side effect that may be as important in practical terms
as the ruling itself.7 In the case of Miranda v. Arizona,8 for instance, while
lawyers and scholars in the ensuing decades clashed over the merits of
Miranda as a constitutional ruling, law enforcement largely lined up behind
retaining Miranda.9 For despite initial predictions in the wake of the ruling
that confessions would become a remnant of the past in solving crime, law
enforcement over time learned not only to live with Miranda but to largely
embrace it.10 The ruling, as it turned out, brought to law enforcement a
desired predictability and stability in ensuring that a confession would pass
constitutional muster; indeed, the warnings often are now incorporated into
the interrogation ritual itself as a way of obtaining confessions. As a result,
a ruling that was inspired by the desire to provide greater protection to
criminal suspects has, in the long run, benefited law enforcement as much,
and possibly more. That law enforcement ultimately embraced Miranda
helps to explain why in Dickerson v. United States,I I Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, despite his lengthy history of doubting Miranda's constitutional line-
age, penned the opinion that allowed the ruling to stand, albeit with all the
robustness of a glass of three-day-old beer.
As with Miranda, when it comes to the exclusionary rule, Mapp also
has had a serendipitous effect that should be taken into account as the Rob-
erts Court debates the rule's future. Our usual focus in debating the exclu-
MICH. J.L. REFORM 573 (1989).
7. Professor Leipold, for example, has raised an intriguing possible serendipitous effect from the
adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Noting the rise of a dramatic "conviction gap" between
jury and bench trials beginning in the 1980s, with judges significantly less likely to convict than juries
in federal trials, he raises the possibility that "the decrease in judicial discretion brought about by
federal sentencing reform may have an impact on judges when they make the decision to convict or
acquit." Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 151, 225
(2005) (noting that "[tihe evidence is indirect" but "circumstantial evidence is strong enough.., that
the possibility should not be dismissed lightly").
8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9. See generally Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First
Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1021-23 (2001) (developing reasons why "for the most part, law
enforcement supports Miranda"); see also Eduardo Paz-Martinez, Police Chiefs Defend Miranda
Against Meese Threats, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 1987, Metro, at 25 (reporting that police chiefs support
Miranda and express the desire to retain its warnings in the interests of police professionalism and the
protection of individual rights).
10. See Leo, supra note 9, at 1021-22.
11. 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (noting that "Miranda has become embedded in routine police
practices to the point where the warnings have become a part of our national culture").
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sionary rule's deterrent effect is on whether a police officer at the moment
she is about to conduct a search or seizure will be deterred from taking a
Fourth Amendment shortcut because of a fear that the evidence will be
excluded and a possible conviction lost. 12 This essay argues, however, that
this is far too narrow a focus in asking whether the exclusionary rule deters,
because it overlooks one of the most beneficial effects of Mapp-the edu-
cational effects of the suppression hearing itself.13 With the advent of
Mapp, every police action implicating the Fourth Amendment, whether in
rural Montana or downtown Manhattan, instantly became subject to judi-
cial scrutiny as a matter of course in any criminal case involving a search
or seizure. By making suppression hearings necessary, therefore, the exclu-
sionary rule provided a forum through which the importance and substance
of the Fourth Amendment is reaffirmed on a daily basis in city and county
courthouses across the nation. As a result, suppression hearings act much
like a morality play for those involved in the nitty gritty of law enforce-
ment-police officers, judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys-by in-
structing everyone involved both as to the Fourth Amendment's rules and
why those rules are of a constitutional magnitude mandating honor and
respect.
This viewpoint runs the risk of sounding like the pious musings of an
academic kneeling at the altar of abstract constitutionalism. The virtues of
the suppression hearing, however, are grounded in the realities of how
hearings are conducted and in the interactions that they necessitate between
the police and prosecutors and defense attorneys. 14 In short, as this essay
will demonstrate, the suppression hearing is the unsung hero of Mapp, and
the benefits that it brings to the exclusionary rule must be taken into ac-
count if the Court undertakes a broad reexamination of the exclusionary
rule.
As the Court has dealt with the exclusionary rule since Mapp, it has
12. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
13. In arguing against adoption of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, Justice Bren-
nan raised a similar concern over the loss of the "overall educational effect of the exclusionary rule"
and the negative impact on the "institutional incentive" of police departments to ensure compliance.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 954-55 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). While this article agrees
with Justice Brennan about the importance of the "educational effect" in deterrence, the emphasis on
the role of the suppression hearing does not rule out a good-faith exception because for purposes of
fostering individual officer compliance, it is the process that matters even more than the threat that the
evidence will be excluded. See infra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of
alternative sanctions as consistent with maintaining the deterrence effect of the suppression hearing).
14. It was while conducting suppression hearings as a prosecutor that I came to recognize that the
suppression hearing was the unsung hero of Mapp and to appreciate how the hearing itself furthered the
Fourth Amendment and the rule's purposes.
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pared the critical inquiry for the application of the exclusionary rule down
to the basic question of whether "its deterrence benefits outweigh its 'sub-
stantial social costs."' 15 When undertaking this balancing test, the Court
has considered whether alternative remedies-such as civil lawsuits or
police training and discipline-might lessen the need for the rule. Indeed,
in Hudson Justice Scalia suggested that, while those alternative remedies
might have been viewed as inadequate when Mapp was decided, advances
in providing a civil remedy and in the professionalism of modem police
forces may have now tipped the scales back against the exclusionary rule.'
6
Even if Justice Scalia's claims are empirically correct-and reasons
exist to be skeptical about their validity' 7-the effectiveness of other reme-
dies must be considered in comparison to the deterrent effect of the exclu-
sionary rule when making the cost-benefit determination. In this regard,
how the suppression hearing serves to deter Fourth Amendment violations
is an important "weight" to be added to the benefits side of the exclusion-
ary rule that has not been considered before. As will be shown, once the
suppression hearing is added into the balance, the exclusionary rule can be
seen as deterring Fourth Amendment violations not only through the offi-
cer's fear of losing a conviction, but also through enhancement of the offi-
15. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott,
524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)). See also Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009); Leon, 468 U.S. at
907. In Mapp and its immediate aftermath, the Court also had invoked the idea of judicial integrity as a
basis for exclusion. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). The judicial integrity rationale,
however, has since given way to an analysis focusing solely on deterrence. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 921
n.22 (rejecting judicial integrity as an independent basis for exclusion and concluding that whether
admission of evidence "offends the integrity of the courts 'is essentially the same as the inquiry into
whether exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose."' (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459
n.35 (1976))). Justice Ginsburg in her dissent in Herring attempted to resurrect "a more majestic con-
ception" of the exclusionary rule that extended beyond deterrence to include additional purposes such
as judicial integrity. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts in his majority
opinion, however, brusquely dismissed such an argument with the observation, "[m]ajestic or not, our
cases reject this conception." Id. at 700 n.2.
16. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597 ("We cannot assume that exclusion in this context is necessary
deterrence simply because we found that it was necessary deterrence in different contexts and long ago.
That would be forcing the public today to pay for the sins and inadequacies of a legal regime that
existed almost half a century ago.").
17. See id. at 610-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning the effectiveness of civil remedies and
police training in deterring police violations of the Fourth Amendment). Indeed, one of the authors that
Justice Scalia cited for how the increased professionalism of police diminished the need for an exclu-
sionary rule later strongly protested that "[Scalia] twisted my main argument to reach a conclusion the
exact opposite of what I spelled out in [the cited study] and other studies." Samuel Walker, Op-Ed.,
Thanks for Nothing, Nino, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at M5; see also Holbrook Mohr, Some States Put
Untrained Cops on Duty, Associate Press,
http://www.foxnews.com/printer-friendly-wires/2007Mar6/0,4675,UntrainedPolice,00.htmi (March 6,
2007) (describing lack of training in many police forces because of funding and manpower shortfalls).
See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 MISS. L.J. 483 (2006) (examining civil and disciplinary reme-
dies and concluding that they have generally been ineffective).
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cer's knowledge, the officer's realization that she may have to justify her
actions in a public adversarial venue, and the reaffirmation of the impor-
tance of the Amendment itself.
I. THE EDUCATIONAL FUNCTION OF SUPPRESSION HEARINGS
Police have a daunting task when it comes to interactions with the
public. On the streets through everyday interactions they are likely to have
a multitude of "Fourth Amendment moments" ranging from the routine
(pulling over cars for traffic violations) to the unexpected (spotting suspi-
cious behavior while walking a beat) to conducting surveillance. Not sur-
prisingly, these encounters will challenge the officer in the field with what
essentially is an ongoing issue-spotting exam-Do I have probable cause?
Reasonable suspicion? Can I search the trunk now? Do I have consent? Is
this search going to require a warrant?
Such repeated Fourth Amendment moments, of course, offer ample
opportunity for a police officer to develop an understanding of the rules
governing police-citizen encounters. The difficulty, though, is that without
some type of objective feedback, the officer has no meaningful means of
gauging whether her assessment of probable cause or whether her decision
to forego obtaining a warrant in a particular situation was the legally cor-
rect one. To the extent that officers do receive guidance in the field, the
feedback is likely to come from other police officers who are accompany-
ing them in the field or who review their work at the stationhouse. Even in
progressive jurisdictions that provide ongoing training, the instruction nor-
mally is conducted by individuals connected with the police or prosecution,
and will not address an individual officer's actual conduct of searches and
seizures in the field.
As a consequence, if an officer's Fourth Amendment understanding
was left to rest at this juncture, the result would be a police-centered im-
plementation of the Amendment based on practice, custom, and individual
belief of what the Amendment requires. This is not to suggest that a police-
centered understanding would reflect a bad-faith or conscious desire on the
part of the police to alter or dilute the courts' interpretation of the Amend-
ment. Indeed, as will be argued later, one of the suppression hearing's vir-
tues is that it brings to the judiciary's attention the realities of police
practice in formulating Fourth Amendment rules. Rather, the point simply
is that even good-intentioned police officers without some type of feedback
from neutral sources will develop their sense of Fourth Amendment
norms-for example, what is probable cause or reasonable suspicion or
exigency-from what they and their fellow officers do in practice through
2010]
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the numerous Fourth Amendment moments they face in carrying out their
duties.
While the possibility exists that the norms developed in the field will
coincide with the judiciary's interpretation, doubts arise since the officers'
development of Fourth Amendment interpretations in the field will reflect
the reality, as Justice Jackson long ago observed, that police are "engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 18 Most impor-
tantly, though, without some type of oversight mechanism, it will be nearly
impossible for police officers or departments to know whether their prac-
tices are, in fact, complying with Fourth Amendment law as articulated by
the courts. In other words, to expect police officers to be able to intelli-
gently and conscientiously carry out their duties in accord with the Fourth
Amendment requires some type of forum in which they can see how their
actions match up with the legal standards.
One critical function of a suppression hearing, therefore, is to provide
the type of feedback from outside the officer's own circle that helps im-
prove decision making and understanding of the Fourth Amendment's re-
quirements.19 Again, this rationale need not and does not posit that police
officers are bad-faith actors determined to undermine the Amendment.
Rather, the use of a suppression hearing provides the type of input and
transparency that improves decision making in place of a closed-loop cy-
cling of judgment and information. The need to test one's own decision
making against outside standards is especially great where the type of deci-
sions are factually intensive and prone to subjective biases, a situation that
of course describes well an officer in the field deciding whether, for exam-
ple, probable cause exists as she carries out her duties of "ferreting" out
crime. 20
18. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
19. Studies have found that when an officer is forced to articulate reasons for probable cause
before a magistrate and obtains a search warrant, her success rate in recovering the evidence sought can
be over 80%. Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San Diego:
Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 221, 248-49
(2000). However, when a warrantless search is conducted by the officer on the spot, such as with an
automobile search, the success rate has been found to be as low as 12%. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2005, at 7 (2007). Cf Craig
Bennell, Improving Police Decision Making: General Principles and Practical Applications of Receiver
Operating Characteristic Analysis, 19 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1157, 1173 (2005) (explaining
how a procedure that provides for measures of "hits and false alarms" can "allow the police to identify
what evidence they should use to make their decisions, to determine if their choice of evidence should
differ depending on their particular situation, and to compare the accuracy of different groups of deci-
sion makers").
20. Cognitive psychology has begun to develop an understanding of how individuals make choic-
es and judgments using cognitive strategies to handle what otherwise would be an overwhelming
amount of information for their brains to process. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R.
Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 555-58
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The critical question in these contexts, therefore, is not whether a po-
lice officer without such feedback would act only on what he or she be-
lieves is probable cause, but whether the officer's police-centered
definition is in accord with the legal standard as developed and applied by
the courts, which of course is the controlling standard.21 A study of Chi-
cago Narcotics officers found that suppression hearings were for the police
"not only the most important way of learning about changes in the law, but
(2002) (summarizing cognitive psychology findings on how individuals use schema and heuristics to
process complex stimuli). For certain types of cognitive judgments, feedback can improve decision
making by allowing the identification of situations where the individual's cognitive strategies do not
produce reliable judgments. Id. at 559-60.
A debate currently exists as to whether concepts like probable cause or reasonable suspicion
are cognitive decisions that can be articulated and assessed based on objective criteria or are more like
an expert's "hunches" that should be given great (or total) judicial deference based on an officer's
experience and training. Professor Craig Lerner in particular has done much to bring this topic to the
fore and has argued forcefully that legal doctrines like Terry v. Ohio's demand that an officer have
more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch' to stop and frisk, see 392 U.S. 1, 27
(1968), are out of touch with the realities of police decision making and cognitive psychology. See, e.g.,
Craig S. Lerner, Judges Policing Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 25 (2007). Others have argued just as
forcefully that little evidence exists to suggest that police hunches are reliable and contend, therefore,
that deference to police hunches would invite or exacerbate various ills such as police perjury and racial
bias. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Upside and Downside of Police Hunches and Expertise, 4 J.L.
ECON. & POL'Y 115 (2007); see also James R. Acker, Social Sciences and the Criminal Law: The
Fourth Amendment, Probable Cause, and Reasonable Suspicion, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 49, 57-58 (1987)
(citing studies finding that police tend to err in overpredicting that a crime is being committed as evi-
dence that judges should not defer to police in assessments of probable cause and reasonable suspicion).
For a superb overview of the debate from a variety of perspectives, see Symposium, Rational Hunches
and Policing, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 1 (2007).
The debate over whether current Fourth Amendment legal doctrine should be changed to be
more accommodating of police "hunches" is beyond this essay's scope. This essay's starting point is
that current constitutional doctrine reflects a legal interpretation of what constitutes concepts like
probable cause and reasonable suspicion in light of the Fourth Amendment's history and purposes, and
officers are legally and ethically required to obey those rules. Given that starting point, suppression
hearings are an effective way of communicating to officers how their behavior and judgments match up
with the Court's interpretation of Fourth Amendment constitutional restraints. See generally Orfield,
supra note 5, at 1037-39 (quoting various officers describing how suppression rulings changed their
legal understanding of topics such as when they could stop an individual based on apparent drunken-
ness, how they could use time of night as a justification for a stop, what was necessary to make "street
stops," and why obtaining a warrant was preferable to a warrantless search); see also infra notes 28-31
and accompanying text. Indeed, to the extent constitutional constraints may chafe against an officer's
intuitive sense of what constitutes sufficient reason to search or detain, it is all the more important that
suppression hearings serve as a vehicle for providing feedback to the police of how their sense of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion may be at odds with the constitutional meaning.
21. This argument is not based on the assumption that judges throughout the United States will
apply a uniform notion of standards such as probable cause or exigency. As Ron Allen and Ross Ro-
senberg have persuasively argued, it may well be that much of the Fourth Amendment is "local" knowl-
edge that defies a "general" overarching theory. See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth
Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1149 (1998). Rather, the important point is that the "local" knowledge that develops must reflect
judicial input through adversarial testing to ensure that the "local" knowledge does not become captive
to a definition solely controlled by police practice. Thus, skepticism about the ability to concretely
define in a general way many Fourth Amendment principles does not mean that judicial rulings cannot
act as corrective measures for police in actual settings and as a means of guiding future police actions
based on the judicial feedback.
2010]
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also the most effective way of learning about the law of search and seizure
in general."'22 As one interviewed officer noted, the suppression hearing
provides the window through which to understand the legal nature of prob-
able cause: "'It is easy to read about what probable cause is, but you don't
know the reality of probable cause until you get to court. When you are in
court, you find out what gets past the judge and what doesn't.' 23 Thus,
while the current cost-benefit analysis of the exclusionary rule tends to
focus on deterring the bad-faith rogue cop, suppression hearings are essen-
tial because they also serve a vital educational function for the good cop
who otherwise would be forced to carry out his or her duties deprived of
critical outside information and assessment. 24
Nor can the two alternatives-civil lawsuits and internal police super-
vision-act as a meaningful substitute for the suppression hearing for pro-
moting deterrence in this manner. The civil rights cases will tend to target
only the most egregious cases where an attorney believes the likelihood of
success is great and that the potential for damages warrants the efforts of
litigation. Even with the expanded availability of attorney fees, which Jus-
tice Scalia argued in Hudson would lead more lawyers to take "police mis-
conduct" cases, fees under § 1988(b) are available only if the party
prevails.25 The requirement that the attorney prevail will discourage attor-
neys from filing cases unless they have a high degree of confidence upfront
that the officers were acting in bad faith and that the police behavior and
client's profile is likely to result in a favorable jury verdict (and in this
latter regard even a potential claimant with a strong Fourth Amendment
claim may not strike an attorney as an attractive plaintiff to present to a
jury if criminal evidence was found).
Now, some might believe it desirable to drastically winnow down to
the most egregious cases those that are subjected to judicial scrutiny, but
this position does not make sense if one is serious about promoting police
compliance with the Fourth Amendment. In fact, given the multitude of
Fourth Amendment moments that officers confront, guidance and feedback
is needed least for those cases where a lawsuit is likely, as those are the
cases where officers most probably are fully aware that they are acting
unconstitutionally. In other words, civil lawsuits may be a good mechanism
for punishing the bad cops, but they will do little for helping the good-
intentioned cops in developing a reliable sense of Fourth Amendment stan-
22. Orfield, supra note 5, at 1037.
23. Id. at 1040.
24. Id. at 1032-33.
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) ("[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.").
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dards and bringing their behavior into line with the legal rules. The exclu-
sionary rule and suppression hearing, by contrast, will reach a far greater
swath of actions implicating the Fourth Amendment. For although not a
perfect mechanism for feedback, since only those Fourth Amendment mo-
ments resulting in prosecution will be subject to judicial review, the rule is
invoked often enough to ensure that officers involved in daily law en-
forcement will periodically have their actions subjected to judicial re-
view. 26
At first glance, police training and discipline proceedings might ap-
pear to offer a promising alternative compared to civil suits in promoting
police conformity with the Fourth Amendment through education. Training
would be aimed at providing the same instructional effect that the exclu-
sionary rule furthers through suppression hearings, and disciplinary pro-
ceedings could serve as a means of providing feedback on the officers'
performance in the field. Justice Scalia in his Hudson opinion argued, for
instance, that compared to the time when Mapp was decided, "[n]umerous
sources are now available to teach officers and their supervisors what is
required of them under this Court's cases, how to respect constitutional
guarantees in various situations, and how to craft an effective regime for
internal discipline. '27
The first caveat in looking at whether police training can take over the
educational function of the exclusionary rule is whether the sources "now
available" are actually being implemented in a systemic and comprehensive
fashion throughout the United States. Justice Scalia refers to the "increas-
ing professionalism" among police forces, but does not cite any empirical
basis for the assertion, especially as to what percentage of the federal, state
and local police forces are exposed to thorough training and with what
frequency. 28 One advantage of the exclusionary rule for a country like the
26. A similar concern with the loss of guidance from the courts was raised with the adoption of
the good-faith exception. A Supreme Court majority rejected the argument on the rationale that,
"[a]lthough the exception might discourage presentation of insubstantial suppression motions, the
magnitude of the benefit conferred on defendants by a successful motion makes it unlikely that litiga-
tion of colorable claims will be substantially diminished." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924
n.25 (1984). This reply obviously would have no relevancy if the exclusionary rule were entirely elimi-
nated and suppression hearings no longer held.
27. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006).
28. See id. at 598. One recent study using trained field observers suggests that even well-trained
police departments may still be violating the Fourth Amendment at a startling high rate. Jon B. Gould &
Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior Under the U.S. Constitution, 3
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 315, 324, 331 (2004) (finding that 30% of all searches conducted by a
police department ranked in the top 20% nationwide violated the Fourth Amendment). Cf Bernard E.
Harcourt, Unconstitutional Police Searches and Collective Responsibility, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL'Y 363 (2004) (exploring difficult questions about the tradeoff of allowing greater discretionary
policing but with the inevitable price of more unconstitutional (and sometimes highly invasive) police
20L1
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United States with a highly decentralized police force is that by reaching
into every pocket of America where arrests are made and searches con-
ducted, the rule provides some measure of uniformity in application.
29
A second caveat is whether the training can break through the police-
centered implementation of the Fourth Amendment with the same effec-
tiveness as the suppression hearing. This is not an inherent shortcoming in
police training, because a training regime could incorporate instructors with
perspectives from outside the ranks of police, and many do draw upon
prosecutors and academics as teachers. Several major hurdles exist, though.
First, the training may not reach the realities of the officer in the field
for providing feedback. Simulations and role playing may assist, but as
anyone knows who has gone from a litigation course to an actual court-
room, conducting a cross-examination of a hypothetical witness is a far cry
from the challenges of questioning an actual witness without a script.
Likewise, information from the classroom may lose something in the trans-
lation when the police officer tries to use it to make judgment calls in the
field, and the officer will not receive any feedback as to whether her ac-
tions are in fact conforming with what she was taught. The exclusionary
rule, on the other hand, of course fills that gap, as a suppression hearing
will be focused on judicial scrutiny of the officer's field actions (or as one
Chicago narcotics officer put it, "[g]oing to court is more concrete than
training. It is on-the-job training, and like on-the-job training it is the most
useful way of learning." 30).
More fundamentally, in-house training sessions-even those that in-
clude critiques by neutral observers-simply cannot match an adversarial
hearing for breaking out of a police-centered perspective. One of the vir-
tues of adversarial testing is that it combats the human tendency to fall
victim to "tunnel vision" and cognitive dissonance, tendencies which often
preclude someone from fully seeing an alternative version of events.31 De-
fense attorneys by looking at a fact pattern through their own "tunnel vi-
sion" of the client's case are far more apt to actively seek out and point to
alternative interpretations of fact patterns and the law. Again, this is not a
searches).
29. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4.126 (1981) (identifying
the United States' decentralized police force as a distinguishing rationale for justifying the exclusionary
rule). The Mapp opinion itself justified the exclusionary rule in part by the need to provide consistency
among the various state courts and between the states and federal government. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 657-58 (1961).
30. Orfield, supra note 5, at 1040.
31. For a thorough overview of the susceptibility to tunnel vision in the criminal justice context,
see Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases,
2006 Wis. L. REv. 291.
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surprising psychological proposition for those in the legal field-any law-
yer knows that the best preparation possible for an argument or trial is hav-
ing someone aggressively think through and present the other side. This
means that a suppression hearing with its active testing of the facts and law
will be superior to training in giving police officers (and, indeed, all par-
ties) a fuller understanding of the Fourth Amendment as it applies to the
police actions involved.
Nor are disciplinary hearings able to produce a similar deterrence
effect. As with civil litigation, such proceedings will be reserved for the
more egregious cases and normally will require some triggering event such
as a citizen complaint to be filed. As noted earlier, one of the exclusionary
rule's advantages is that the concern is not solely with bad-faith cops but
also with well-intentioned police behavior that may fall outside legal
bounds because the officers' understanding of "probable cause" or "exi-
gency" or "reasonable suspicion" has not been aligned with the courts'
interpretations. For such officers, the corrective measure is not punishment
but better information and understanding, which the suppression hearing
can help provide.
Finally, the exclusionary rule yields an additional instructional avenue
that is important but easily overlooked. Because suppression motions are a
frequent part of a criminal prosecution, the prosecutor will need to review
with the officers the nature of the search or seizure and the circumstances
surrounding it. Especially with large metropolitan police forces, this is
likely to be one of the few points (other than applying for warrants32) in
which prosecutors will talk with police officers about how they are carrying
out searches and seizures. Given that the prosecutor must defend the police
behavior, the discussion can be an invaluable process for prosecutors to
give feedback on police procedures. Moreover, the process can be espe-
cially productive since the discussion will revolve around a concrete fact
pattern in which the prosecutor will be pointing to specific ways that cer-
tain decisions and procedures made the officer's actions either more or less
likely to hold up in court. 33
32. A study of search warrant practices in San Diego, for instance, found that 98.4% of search
warrant affidavits had been reviewed by a Deputy District Attorney before submission to a judge.
Benner & Samarkos, supra note 19, at 225.
33. See Orfield, supra note 5, at 1033 ("The preparation for [a suppression hearing] appears to
reinforce lessons so strongly that months and even years later some officers can remember exactly what
happened and why evidence was suppressed.").
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II. THE COST OF ELIMINATING SUPPRESSION HEARINGS: CREATING
FOURTH AMENDMENT DEAD-ZONES AND LOSING THE DETERRENCE
BENEFITS OF RATIONALE ARTICULATION
Being required to justify one's judgment and actions is not an experi-
ence to be relished and often can be misunderstood as a challenge to one's
integrity. Yet our legal system has to rely on such inquiries as the primary
means of obtaining the information necessary to determine if a particular
actor's actions and judgments are in accord with the law. Where the courts
are charged with ensuring trial processes and rights, a forum to develop the
underlying facts is unavoidable. Potential jurors must answer questions in
voir dire to determine if they can fairly sit in judgment of a case. Prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys can be required to justify their exercise of a per-
emptory challenge to ensure the rationale is non-discriminatory. And,
because of the exclusionary rule, law enforcement agents can be required to
testify as to their reasoning and judgment to see if they acted in accord with
the Fourth Amendment.
Because the elimination of the exclusionary rule would also abolish
the suppression hearing, it is important to realize the consequences of tak-
ing away this judicial forum. One of the most immediate, and indeed dra-
matic, consequences of eliminating suppression hearings would be the
almost complete disengagement of the courts from the development and
defining of Fourth Amendment law.34 Civil suits would still be a possibil-
ity, but, as noted earlier, because of good-faith immunity and the limited
possibility of damages, such suits would likely focus only on the most
egregious cases. A "dead-zone" of Fourth Amendment law in terms of
judicial involvement, therefore, would grow up around the multitude of
Fourth Amendment moments where police may or may not be violating the
Amendment's standards, but no mechanism or incentive would exist to get
the police behavior before a judicial forum. Judges would still be involved
in the issuance of warrants, but warrantless searches and seizures would
largely go without judicial scrutiny and a police-centered interpretation of
34. Professor Cloud has convincingly argued that the Supreme Court's embracing of the exclu-
sionary rule is best understood as a reaction to the need for judicial review. He maintains that past
experience ultimately led the Court to conclude that if enforcement of the Fourth Amendment was left
to the political branches, it effectively meant that Fourth Amendment rights would be left without
remedy or vindication. Morgan Cloud, Rights Without Remedies: The Court that Cried "Wolf" 77
Miss. L.J. 467 (2007) (examining the Court's view of the exclusionary rule as a question of judicial
review, and especially tracing Chief Justice Warren's changing view on the need for the exclusionary
rule as he became convinced that the political branches would not curb police misbehavior).
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the Fourth Amendment would prevail. And since the vast majority of
searches are warrantless 35 the impact of removing these searches and sei-
zures from judicial review would be massive, with the impact amplified
even more if Justice Scalia's argument to curtail the warrant preference
prevails in the future.3
6
Beyond the loss of judicial input, the elimination of suppression
hearings also would undermine police deterrence by taking away a forum
that requires officers to articulate their rationale before undertaking a
search. In the Fourth Amendment context, this articulation process ideally
occurs prior to the search or seizure in the form of applying to a judge for a
warrant. Indeed, although the warrant requirement is sometimes criticized
as a rubber stamp because of the high percentage of search warrant applica-
tions which are granted, the criticism overlooks the value of requiring po-
lice officers to articulate to a judge (or to a prosecutor if the prosecutor is to
apply for the warrant) their rationale as to why probable cause exists. Thus
while 98% of all warrants applied for might be approved, the more impor-
tant figures may be how many searches are not performed when an officer
realizes that she is not likely to obtain a warrant, or how many investiga-
tions are taken a step further because the officer realizes she does not have
sufficient facts to convince a magistrate of probable cause. While such data
does not exist, it is reasonable to assume that the warrant requirement is in
fact eliminating searches and arrests where officers (and prosecutors),
when forced to articulate their rationale in anticipation of applying for a
warrant, realize they do not have the facts to justify the warrant and so do
not apply for one. (This winnowing out process also helps explain studies
finding that search warrants yield high hit rates in finding evidence. 37)
The value of the warrant requirement, therefore, may not just be the
independent review of the magistrate, but also the prophylactic effect of
requiring would-be warrant applicants to articulate their rationale in ad-
vance and, through the articulation process, discouraging searches where
the would-be applicant realizes she does not have probable cause without
more. (Indeed, many legal doctrines may have a prophylactic effect that
35. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1037, 1050 n.62 (1996) ("'The vast majority of searches are conducted without a warrant..
(quoting RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS 19 (1985))).
36. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (contending
that, based on historical practice, the Fourth Amendment should not be seen as preferring warrants but
as limiting their use). See generally Amar, supra note 4, at 759 (arguing that properly understood
historically, the Fourth Amendment's words do "not require warrants, probable cause, or exclusion of
evidence, but they do require that all searches and seizures be reasonable").
37. See, e.g., Benner & Samarkos, supra note 19, at 248-49 (study of search warrant practices in
San Diego finding search warrants produced a high hit rate (80%)).
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would demonstrate the doctrine to be more effective than first believed.
Batson v. Kentucky, 38 for instance, is often critiqued because of the re-
ported challenges that are denied on apparently flimsy excuses. Batson,
however, undoubtedly has discouraged many lawyers from making strikes
that they otherwise would have if they did not think they would be forced
to justify it to a judge; in this sense, Batson has deterred improperly moti-
vated strikes far beyond the Batson challenges that judges have upheld.39)
The exclusionary rule and the prospect of a suppression hearing also
help in several ways to reinforce the Court's preference that searches be
conducted pursuant to a warrant. First, some officers will prefer obtaining a
warrant if possible to diminish the possibility of having to later testify in
the adversarial and sometimes hostile setting of a suppression hearing
(cross-examination is not an experience relished by many). Officers, more-
over, soon learn that in a post-Leon world obtaining a warrant redirects the
focus of the Fourth Amendment scrutiny onto the magistrate's determina-
tion and often means that the search will go unchallenged.40 In this sense,
the preference for a warrant becomes roughly comparable to how police
came to prefer giving Miranda warnings because they provided a relatively
safe harbor from judicial reversal. 41 To the extent the exclusionary rule and
38. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
39. See generally Scott E. Sundby, The Death Penalty's Future: Charting the Crosscurrents of
Declining Death Sentences and the McVeigh Factor, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1940-41 & n.52 (2006)
(arguing that the prophylactic effect of Batson has been a factor in reducing the number of death sen-
tences).
The grand jury requirement may also have a prophylactic effect that makes the right more
valuable than is often appreciated. At first glance, the statistics would suggest that a grand jury could
indeed be persuaded to indict a ham sandwich. See, e.g., DAVID BURNHAM, ABOVE THE LAW: SECRET
DEALS, POLITICAL FIXES AND OTHER MISADVENTURES OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE passim
(1996) (true bill rates are close to 100%); see also Thomas P. Sullivan & Robert D. Nachman, IfIt Ain't
Broke, Don't Fix It: Why the Grand Jury's Accusatory Function Should Not Be Changed, 75 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1047, 1050 n.16 (1984). A prosecutor in anticipation of having to present her case
before the grand jury, though, will evaluate the witnesses and evidence with a more careful eye, a
process that likely leads in some cases to a lowering of charges or even a dismissal. Likewise, the grand
jury itself may improve prosecutorial efficiency by acting as a "sounding board" for the prosecutor in
ways that may not be reflected in the statistics. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and
Constitutional Design, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 703, 756-58 (2008).
40. Benner & Samarkos, supra note 19, at 264-66 (noting a high conviction rate and an absence
of suppression motions where warrants were obtained); see also id. at 221 (quoting officer as saying
"[s]earch warrants are so easy and they can't argue with you once you do them"); Orfield, supra note 5,
at 1039 (quoting various officers explaining how suppression rulings led them to develop a preference
for obtaining a warrant as a means of insulating the search from challenge).
41. The parallel is not exact as one would not predict that the law enforcement community would
advocate against the abolition of the exclusionary rule in the same way that it did against abolishing
Miranda. The difference is that if Miranda had been abolished, every confession still could have been
challenged in court as a violation of due process, so judicial scrutiny could still be expected but without
the predictability of Miranda. Abolishing the exclusionary rule, on the other hand, would dramatically
curtail judicial scrutiny altogether, a prospect that might be more appealing as few actors are anxious to
have their actions scrutinized and questioned by others.
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suppression hearings encourage officers to seek warrants, therefore, they
help ensure that searches and seizures are being constitutionally con-
ducted.42
Even in cases where police conduct a warrantless search or seizure,
however, the prospect of a suppression hearing will foster better constitu-
tional compliance in the field. In deciding to undertake a search or seizure
without a warrant, the prospect of having to articulate the rationale later in
open court will influence both the decision to conduct the search or seizure
and how it is conducted. While not formally articulated as in a warrant
application, an officer, especially one who has been through a suppression
hearing before, will still ask herself, "can I legally justify this if on the
stand?" 43 Requiring someone to articulate a rationale and think critically
about her initial judgment can improve decision making, especially in areas
of decision making that are susceptible to confirmation bias (the tendency
to interpret evidence in accord with preexisting beliefs and expectations). 44
The realization that one may have to later justify one's actions under
cross-examination before a judge, therefore, will cause an officer to take a
careful second look, a process that may lead the officer to either forego the
search, do more investigation, or seek a prosecutor's advice if she then has
doubts.45 This process is not unlike the attorney who before striking a ve-
nire person asks herself, "how will I justify this peremptory challenge to
the judge if opposing counsel raises Batson?," a question to one's self that
both spawns a careful second look and may deter the challenge altogether if
the attorney realizes she has no viable non-discriminatory justification. A
42. While finding in their study of search warrant practices in San Diego that warrants on balance
were currently serving their constitutional purposes, Benner and Samarkos also warned of an "increas-
ing use of boilerplate in affidavits" with an attendant danger that it would turn the search warrant
process into a "mere ritual" or "game" based on "cookie cutter affidavits." Benner & Samarkos, supra
note 19, at 265-66.
43. As noted earlier, a debate is ongoing over the desirability of requiring articulation of objective
facts and an objective rationale for a search, beyond an officer's hunch. See supra note 20. But as also
noted before, because under current constitutional law hunches are not a sufficient Fourth Amendment
justification, the critical question is whether suppression hearings will promote police compliance with
the Court's legal standards that govern the officer's pending search. Therefore, to the extent the pros-
pect of a suppression hearing encourages an officer to take a careful second look to see if the search can
be justified apart from his or her hunch, Fourth Amendment compliance will be furthered.
44. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2
REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 211 (1998) (citing evidence that forcing an individual to provide reasons for
and, more importantly, against a judgment can help to overcome cognitive biases).
45. The police in the study of Chicago narcotics officers gave a number of examples where les-
sons learned from prior suppression hearings led them to ask themselves later in the field how a search
or seizure would be legally assessed before deciding to undertake it. Orfield, supra note 5, at 1038. The
study's author concluded that "testifying in court before a hostile adversary and an impatient and possi-
bly skeptical judge has salutary effects: the officer must carefully consider whether he had a legally
acceptable basis for his action; and whether this action might be questioned." Id. at 1032-33.
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similar effect can be seen in how Brady v. Maryland will cause a prosecu-
tor debating whether to turn over evidence to the defense to ask herself,
"how would I later justify to a judge not turning over this evidence?," a
self-inquiry that promotes greater compliance with Brady.
46
It would be nalve, of course, to suggest that the prospect of appearing
in a judicial forum will deter all police misbehavior (or Batson and Brady
violations). Some might even argue that it leads to creative post-hoc ration-
alizations or creates more police lying ("testilying").47 These incidents
undoubtedly will occur, but it would be the height of perverseness to re-
ward perjury in a particular setting by adopting a remedy of eliminating the
setting all together. The remedy, rather, is to more aggressively use the
tools available to curtail it. This includes all the actors living up to their
duties-prosecutors not turning a blind eye, judges evaluating officer tes-
timony with a critical eye,48 and defense lawyers sufficiently prepared to
fully cross-examine an officer (the deterrence effect of effective cross-
examination by competent defense counsel is often underestimated-lying
is not as easy as it may first appear when being questioned by a lawyer who
46. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Using Brady as an example may not inspire great
confidence as many have argued that Brady largely has been a failure in prompting prosecutors to turn
over exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road
to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 257, 306-15 (2008); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for
Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693 (1987); Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a
Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22
OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 833, 902 (1997). While a valid general critique, Brady still undoubtedly has led
prosecutors to hand over more evidence because they have asked themselves this question (indeed,
discovery may be more forthcoming in part based on whether the judge assigned to the case has a
reputation for strictly enforcing discovery). More importantly, the primary problem with enforcing
Brady is that because Brady places the decision largely in the prosecutor's hands, the likelihood of a
Brady hearing is minimal because the defense will probably never know about the evidence if not
revealed. And because prosecutors will not face adversarial testing of their decision to not disclose, they
are far more likely to fall prey to their own tunnel vision of the case. See generally Scott E. Sundby,
Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L.
REv. 643 (2002). One would suspect, on the other hand, that far more potential Brady material would
be disclosed if a prosecutor's decision was likely to be subjected to judicial scrutiny. The shortcomings
of Brady, therefore, in fact highlight the desirability of having decisions made where a significant
likelihood exists that any one decision will be subjected to adversarial testing in open court.
47. See generally Slobogin, supra note 35, at 1058-59 (suggesting that abolishing the exclusion-
ary rule might reduce incidents of police perjury). See also Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43
EMORY L.J. 1311 (1994); Donald A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 693 (1996); Amir Efrati, Legal System Struggles with How to React when Police Offi-
cers Lie, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2009, at A12, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123319367364627211.html (suggesting that the Supreme Court is
loosening the exclusionary rule to reduce police incentives to lie); Frederic N. Tulsky et al., Charges of
Police Lying Haunt Cases, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1996, at Al (giving examples of different situations in
which police perjury can affect cases).
48. See Benjamin Weiser, Police in Gun Searches Face Disbelief in Court, N.Y. Times, May 12,
2008 (describing instances where judges found officers lying at suppression hearings), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/12/nyregion/12guns.html.
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knows her case). Observers have suggested additional measures worth con-
sidering, such as expanded use of warrants, 49 increased use of videotaping
police actions,50 a better accounting for the realities of police behavior in
judicial decision making, 51 and the use of sanctions other than exclusion of
evidence. 5
2
More fundamentally, the concern with perjury, though a serious one,
should not be allowed to undermine the broader goal of enhancing Fourth
Amendment compliance not only for the bad-faith cop (the individual most
likely to lie), but for the police force as a whole by triggering the careful
second look. And, in this regard not only are civil suits and police discipli-
nary proceedings no less likely to confront problems with perjury, but they
have the inherent flaw noted earlier of being poor substitutes because they
will not reach the vast bulk of Fourth Amendment moments that officers
face on a daily basis. Nor can better training, even assuming widespread
availability, have the same psychological effect on the police officer as the
knowledge that he or she may have to justify her actions in open court
while being cross-examined.
A danger exists that this argument for suppression hearings may sound
as if it doubts the professionalism or integrity of the police. It does not.
Explaining one's factual assumptions and reasoning in open court under
questioning may feel at times like a challenge to one's integrity, but it is
integral to our legal system's method of enforcing legal rules. A suppres-
sion hearing by itself no more impugns a police officer's integrity than a
Batson hearing means that a lawyer is racist, a Brady hearing that a prose-
cutor is corrupt, or an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance that a
defense attorney is incompetent. Rather, in a system that values transpar-
ency and obedience to the rule of law, adversarial hearings are simply the
most effective means of vindicating those values. Indeed, even where sup-
pression is ordered because of a constitutional violation, it would be a mis-
take to understand the ruling as a condemnation of the officers involved-
rules are often broken not through nefarious intent but through errors of
judgment, errors that can then be corrected.
49. See Cloud, supra note 47, at 1345-48.
50. See Dripps, supra note 47, at 715-16.
51. See Slobogin,supra note 35 at 1056-58.
52. See id. at 1058-59. Professor Slobogin suggests, for instance, replacing exclusion of evidence
with liquidated damages based on a proposal by Professor Davidow. Id.; see Robert P. Davidow, Crim-
inal Procedure Ombudsman Revisited, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 939 (1982). The use of an
alternative sanction to exclusion would not necessarily be in conflict with the arguments made in this
article so long as the mechanism reached all cases (not just egregious ones) and involved the type of
hearing and police articulation found in suppression hearings. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying
text.
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To see it otherwise would be to take a mistaken view of thinking of
the Fourth Amendment's requirements as standards entrusted to the police
rather than as rules which we rely on the police to faithfully implement.
There are times where we do defer to an actor because the very act called
upon is an exercise of professional judgment; thus, with prosecutorial dis-
cretion, a prosecutor's files need be opened only where credible evidence
exists that a prosecutor is abusing her discretion for bad-faith reasons.
53
But the Fourth Amendment is not of this nature-it does not ban "unrea-
sonable searches and seizures" as determined by the police, but "unreason-
able searches and seizures" as measured against a constitutional standard
defined by the courts. Thus, just as a prosecutor could not defeat a Brady
claim by stating, "but judge I honestly thought the evidence was not excul-
patory" if the judge finds the evidence to in fact be exculpatory, a search or
seizure does not become "reasonable" even if an officer mistakenly be-
lieved she was obeying the Fourth Amendment. And as has been shown, if
we want the legal system to deter Fourth Amendment violations, suppres-
sion hearings diminish the likelihood of future mistakes of judgment be-
cause officers will see the law applied to their actions and internalize the
notion that future searches and seizures will need to be justified in court.
III. THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF SUPPRESSION HEARINGS
A final attribute of suppression hearings that promotes police compli-
ance is the expressive value that results from judicial hearings. The general
symbolic value of the exclusionary rule has been noted by others. Justice
Stevens, for instance, argued for the application of the exclusionary rule to
school searches because of the importance of the message that it sends:
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the mean-
ingful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing citi-
zenry. If the Nation's students can be convicted through the use of
arbitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they cannot help but
feel that they have been dealt with unfairly. The application of the exclu-
sionary rule in criminal proceedings arising from illegal school searches
makes an important statement to young people that "our society attaches
serious consequences to a violation of constitutional rights," and that this
is a principle of "liberty and justice for all."
'54
Some scholars have similarly noted that "[tihe exclusionary rule has an
53. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (noting that prosecutorial discretion
is a "special province" charged to the executive branch and thus "' in the absence of clear evidence to
the contrary, courts presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged their official duties."' (quoting
United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926))).
54. New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 469 U.S. 325, 373-74 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
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important symbolic significance. It is a statement that we are serious about
lowering the number of Fourth Amendment violations in our society. '55
Once considered in conjunction with the suppression hearing, how-
ever, the exclusionary rule offers more than just a symbolic exclamation
point to the importance of the Fourth Amendment. As psychologists have
documented, the willingness to conform one's behaviors to rules and stan-
dards is affected in part by whether she perceives society as placing a high
value on the rules. 56 The convening of a suppression hearing communicates
the importance with which society views both the officer's actions and the
Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the value that is communicated goes to the
full multitude of Fourth Amendment moments rather than only to those
instances where an officer faces discipline or a lawsuit. Nor does the mes-
sage depend on the evidence actually being excluded, as the importance of
the message is that police knowledge and obedience to the Fourth Amend-
ment are so important to the courts and criminal justice system that we will
subject them to judicial scrutiny.
Moreover, the hearings are a two-way street in terms of information.
The hearings allow judges who come to the bench without a criminal law
background to quickly gain an understanding of the realities of law en-
forcement, and for all judges to keep a pulse on how law enforcement is
adapting and changing on the streets. Thus, while the judges' rulings are
part of the feedback loop aimed at ensuring that police act upon legal stan-
dards rather than self-developed (police-centered) norms, suppression hear-
ings also allow judges to craft Fourth Amendment rules that foster police
compliance and respect. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in writing about
review standards for probable cause, Fourth Amendment rules must reflect
realistic expectations about police work to encourage compliance: "If the
affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected to the type of scrutiny
some courts have deemed appropriate, police might well resort to war-
rantless searches, with the hope of relying on consent or some other excep-
tion to the Warrant Clause that might develop at the time of the search."
'57
Thus, while at first it may sound starry eyed to speak of the suppres-
55. See, e.g., John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1055
(1974) (also arguing, however, that the rule should be modified to work more effectively).
56. See Arnold S. Rosenberg, Motivational Law, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 111, 135-36 (2008) (citing
studies showing people are more likely to adhere to rules that they believe are valued by their peers);
see also Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science Investi-
gation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004) (discussing correlation between individuals' willingness
to follow rules and their perception of society's valuing of the rules).
57. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). See also Slobogin, supra note 35, at 1055-57
(arguing that greater sensitivity to the realities of police work in defining "probable cause" may help
reduce incidents of police perjury).
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sion hearing as having intrinsic value as a ritual that confirms for all the
actors the importance of the Fourth Amendment, the value is not an ab-
stract one. As anyone who has worked in the criminal justice system can
attest, it is relatively easy for the "big picture" to get lost amidst the daily
grind and demands. Suppression hearings are often the pause in the stream
of Fourth Amendment moments that remind everyone-police officers,
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys-that the rules and standards are
part of a larger fabric that society values.
IV. REVISITING THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF MAPP V. OHIO
When all is said and done, it may be that one of the most beneficial
effects from the Court's adoption of the exclusionary rule was that it led to
the suppression hearing becoming a standard feature of the legal landscape.
With the rise of the suppression hearing, the entire range of police-citizen
encounters in every city and burg became subject to judicial review. And
even if serendipitous, the effect has been a strengthening of compliance
with the Amendment, a deterrent effect that could be achieved only through
a mechanism that reaches not only bad-faith acts, but the entire range of
Fourth Amendment moments that comprise an officer's enforcement du-
ties. By providing a public forum with adversarial testing, the suppression
hearing enhances Fourth Amendment compliance through avenues well-
known from common experience: by providing outside feedback on judg-
ment, necessitating articulation of one's justifications, and reinforcing the
importance of the Fourth Amendment in guiding law enforcement.
Recognizing the independent contribution of the suppression hearing
to the deterrence effect of the exclusionary rule allows a fuller understand-
ing of the cost-benefit analysis that attaches to the rule. Despite Justice
Scalia's reference in Hudson to the exclusionary rule as a "massive rem-
edy" (he uses the word "massive" four times in reference to the rule), 58
others have argued just the opposite, that "[i]t is doubtful that the exclu-
sionary rule was ever more than a symbolic remedy" because of the rarity
of exclusion and the numerous exceptions that now surround the rule.59
But, as we have seen, even if "symbolic" in the sense that relatively few
58. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595-96, 599 (2006).
59. Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717,
738 (1996). Studies of the exclusionary rule have generally found very low rates of exclusion and lost
convictions. See generally Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE LJ. 906, 915 n.63 (1986) (sum-
marizing empirical studies); but see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 n.6 (1984) (arguing that
the studies are misleading because "the small percentages with which they deal mask a large absolute
number of felons who are released because the cases against them were based in part on illegal searches
or seizures").
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cases are affected by exclusion, holding the suppression hearing and sub-
jecting the officer's judgment to judicial review and adversarial testing has
its own deterrent effect.60
Moreover, identifying the suppression hearing's independent value in
deterring Fourth Amendment violations allows greater flexibility in think-
ing about the future of the exclusionary rule itself. To point out that better
police training and discipline cannot have the equivalent positive effect on
police compliance as a suppression hearing is not to downplay the great
gains to be made through better training. Indeed, it may be that if much of
the exclusionary rule's deterrence effect comes not from the officer's fear
of exclusion itself, but because the process (especially the suppression
hearing) makes her a better Fourth Amendment decision maker, alternative
configurations are possible that may be more palatable to critics of the ex-
clusionary rule. It could be worthwhile, for instance, to revisit Professor
Kaplan's proposal that the exclusionary rule be coupled with giving a judge
the power to avoid ordering exclusion if the judge finds at the suppression
hearing that the department has implemented regulations and procedures so
that the violation was an exception (this proposal would arguably enhance
even further many of the virtues earlier identified, because now the entire
police department would essentially be "articulating" to the court, while
still keeping the individual officer's actions subject to review). 61 Similarly,
if it is largely the process of the exclusionary rule rather than the exclusion
itself that matters, then alternative remedies such as monetary damages in
lieu of exclusion become more desirable as alternatives. 62
60. One of the critiques of the exclusionary rule that is often cited is the judicial "cost in time and
resources" spent on suppression motions. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POL'Y, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6,
at 28-29. In fact, the greatest problem may be that an insufficient number of searches are ever subjected
to suppression hearings. Current estimates are that only 15% of all cases involve the filing of suppres-
sion motions. Gould & Mastrofski, supra note 28, at 332 n. 13 (summarizing studies). Of even greater
concern is Gould & Mastrofski's finding that "[a] search was more likely to be unconstitutional when
suspects were released than when they were arrested or cited" so that "few of the unconstitutional
searches ever reach the inside of a courtroom." Id. at 332, 334. The broader challenge is how to gain
greater oversight, judicial or otherwise, over police actions in a world of expanding discretionary polic-
ing. See Harcourt, supra note 28.
61. See Kaplan, supra note 55, at 1050-52.
62. Professor Dripps's proposal for a "contingent exclusionary rule" has strong appeal in provid-
ing the type of flexibility not possible under the current rule but which also would maintain the educa-
tional benefits of the suppression hearing. See Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent
Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1 (2001). Cf Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The
Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice Blaclanun 's Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing
Judicial Understanding About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 45 (1994) (under-
taking a comparative law examination of the exclusionary rule and examining possible replacements or
modifications).
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CONCLUSION
In the end, no matter what future shape the exclusionary rule takes, the
essential point is the need to recognize that the very process of the suppres-
sion hearing has important values that promote Fourth Amendment compli-
ance. Like the morality plays of the Middle Ages, the suppression hearing
serves as a forum for both instructing and reinforcing the obligations of
those charged with carrying out law enforcement duties as part of their
everyday duties. The virtues of the suppression hearing may not have been
where the Justices thought they would be finding deterrence when they
decided Mapp, but they now are an important part of the legal fabric that
enables police officers to better fulfill both their constitutional and law
enforcement duties.
